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ABSTRACT: The Medicare Advantage (MA) program offers beneficiaries a choice
of private health plans as alternatives to the traditional fee-for-service Medicare
program. MA plans potentially provide additional value, but as plan choices have
proliferated, consumers contemplating their options have had difficulty under-
standing how they differ. Through “standardization”—more consistent types of
information and a limited number of dimensions along which plans vary—MA
plans could reduce complexity and improve beneficiaries’ ability to make
informed choices. Such standardization steps would offer more meaningful varia-
tion in the health coverage options available to beneficiaries, Medicare officials
and their community partners would find it far easier to educate beneficiaries
about their health plan choices, and beneficiaries would better understand what
they were buying. Standardization might also strengthen the ability of the market-
based Medicare Advantage program to incorporate beneficiary preferences.
                        
Overview
The Medicare Advantage (MA) program, offering enrollees the possibility of
reduced out-of-pocket costs together with more comprehensive benefits, was
designed to provide alternatives to Medicare’s traditional fee-for-service pro-
gram. As a result, MA plans have appealed to some low- and modest-income
Medicare beneficiaries who do not have access to employer-sponsored retiree
health insurance and may not be able to afford, or wish to purchase, a private
supplemental insurance (Medigap) policy.1 By the end of 2007, 20 percent of
Medicare beneficiaries were enrolled in an MA plan.2
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But as the number and types of plan offerings
have increased in recent years, the challenges facing
beneficiaries in evaluating their options have increased.
MA choices have become more varied, including not
only Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) and
Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs) but also pri-
vate fee-for-service (PFFS) plans, regional PPOs, med-
ical savings account (MSA) plans, and special needs
plans (SNPs). In theory, the array of alternatives allows
each beneficiary to choose a plan with the coverage,
cost-sharing, provider network, and quality that best fits
his or her individual circumstances. In practice, how-
ever, the proliferation of private plans and the dimen-
sions along which they differ has made it increasingly
difficult for beneficiaries to become informed about,
understand, and compare the available alternatives.
This report describes the variability and com-
plexity of the Medicare Advantage plans and assesses
the consequences of that variation for beneficiary deci-
sion-making. It then poses three options for easing the
situation: 1) stipulating more standardized information
and better tools to support individual decision-making;
2) requiring that plans put a cap on out-of-pocket
costs; and 3) implementing a few standardized benefit
and cost-sharing regimes to limit the numbers of
dimensions along which plans may vary.
Making Difficult Choices
In nearly all areas of the country, Medicare beneficiar-
ies can choose between traditional fee-for-service
Medicare and an array of private MA plans, as a result
of the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003. But with
many more plans of different types to choose from,
beneficiaries face a major information deficit. Because
plans may vary along a great many dimensions, and
because critical information is sometimes missing or
incomplete, it is practically impossible for beneficiar-
ies to assess accurately the value of competing plans—
specifically, to evaluate and compare their out-of-
pocket cost risks.
Beneficiaries receive an annual guide to the
Medicare program, Medicare & You, which provides a
general description of the available options. In addition,
an online search tool, Medicare Options Compare
(previously the Medicare Personal Plan Finder), pro-
vides detailed information on the plans offered in each
area, focusing on the benefits provided and beneficiary
cost-sharing responsibility. This tool is relatively new
and marks a significant improvement in the availabil-
ity of standardized information. A decade ago, benefi-
ciaries relied primarily on plan marketing materials and
information provided by agents. Agents and brokers,
who may be focused on commissions more than the
best interests of their clients, still play a large role, but
today plans must submit standard information to the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).
Even with access to the Internet, however, the
online tool alone does not solve the problem. Although
a great deal of information is available, beneficiaries
often have difficulty understanding its significance and
using it correctly to make decisions. Research has
shown that a majority of beneficiaries have difficulty
correctly interpreting even simple displays of
Medicare health plan information.3 One study reported
that 40 percent of recent Medicare HMO enrollees did
not understand key aspects of Medicare.4 Medicare
beneficiaries’ knowledge about characteristics that dis-
tinguish health plan types is lower still.5 Few benefici-
aries actively contemplate those choices,6 and many of
those who are aware of their options are bewildered by
their complexity.
In 2006, the typical Medicare beneficiary had
about 12 MA plan choices; 5 percent of beneficiaries
had 40 or more plan choices.7 In Milwaukee County,
Wisconsin, for example, Medicare beneficiaries had 11
health plan choices in 2006—two local HMOs, two
local HMOs with a point-of-service (POS) option, one
local PPO, three regional PPOs, one PFFS plan, and
two SNP options that were not open to all beneficiar-
ies. The options have varying benefit designs and cost-
sharing requirements. In 2007, the number of MA
plans available in Milwaukee County had risen to 17,
and the mix of plan types had changed significantly.
In 2008, there are 44 MA plans in total.
Table 1 illustrates some of the information
available in 2006, through the Medicare online tool, to
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(whether one’s own or desired physicians are in net-
work and whether certain hospitals, pharmacies, and
facilities are included) also matter to the prospective
enrollee, as do the conditions for coverage of certain
services—such as limits on covered days of inpatient
hospital care or what services are counted toward any
out-of-pocket cost cap.
Plan utilization-management practices can also
vary widely, and they may significantly affect access
to services and cost risks. In the case of prescription-
drug coverage, even though two plans may both offer
an enhanced prescription drug benefit (that is, a drug
benefit with a cost-sharing arrangement more generous
than Part D’s standard coverage), a prospective
enrollee needs to consider differences in formularies
and cost-sharing as well as in prior-authorization and
step-therapy rules that may limit access to the formu-
lary drugs.
When staff of the Medicare Payment Advisory
Commission (MedPAC) sought to examine variation
across plans in cost-sharing for drugs administered in
physicians’ offices or outpatient settings (and thus not
part of the Part D drug benefit), they also concluded
that it was nearly impossible to estimate beneficiaries’
relative out-of-pocket cost liabilities. In particular, they
had difficulty determining whether out-of-pocket cost
caps applied to these drugs, which are an important
component of care for patients with cancer and certain
other illnesses.8 Although MedPAC staff determined
that a resourceful beneficiary could get some informa-
tion from the printed explanation of benefits provided
by the health plan, even that was unlikely to have
charges for specific drugs. “[N]either we nor CMS
have data that will tell us answers to questions that we
would like to be able to answer,” they concluded.9
Because there is no easy way, and perhaps no
way at all, for beneficiaries to make a straightforward
comparison of one plan against another, most of the
beneficiary counselors we convened observed that
beneficiaries focus on the differences in monthly pre-
miums charged by plans. Premiums are easy for them
to understand and compare, but such comparisons may
be misleading because of important differences in the
4 THE COMMONWEALTH FUND
beneficiaries living in Milwaukee County. Although
this table provides far less than a comprehensive
description of plan benefits—it summarizes cost-shar-
ing for only 12 of the dozens of services that all MA
plans must provide—it does illustrate the choice prob-
lem that beneficiaries faced. Because cost-sharing var-
ied across all benefits in numerous ways, few benefici-
aries could evaluate how their out-of-pocket costs
would differ plan by plan; there were simply too many
moving parts.
How, for example, might a beneficiary decide
between the Plan 1 and Plan 2 of Table 1? Both plans
had modest copayments for doctor office visits, clini-
cal lab services, X-rays, and mammography screening,
but Plan 2 assessed 20 percent coinsurance for outpa-
tient hospital and ambulatory surgical center services
while Plan 1 assessed a flat copayment. The two plans
also differed significantly in cost-sharing for hospital
and nursing home care. A great deal of pertinent infor-
mation was made available, but because plans speci-
fied cost-sharing in different ways, it was very difficult
to make direct comparisons. Most people of any age or
health status would have some difficulty making an
overarching assessment of plan cost-sharing require-
ments for even this limited set of benefits. Even trained
professionals, such as beneficiary counselors or health
policy researchers, find these comparisons challenging.
Beneficiaries in some other locales have faced
even bigger challenges. As shown in Table 2, the diffi-
culties in making an informed choice were signifi-
cantly greater in Pinellas County, Florida, in 2006
because it had far more MA plans (40) than did
Milwaukee County. And by 2008, Pinellas County’s
array had more than doubled, to 91 plans.
Beyond the benefits listed in Tables 1 and 2, a
Medicare beneficiary has to consider even more poten-
tial differences that could affect his or her choice.
These include, for example, the variations in cost-shar-
ing for inpatient and outpatient mental health services,
prescription drugs, and ambulance services or different
options for supplemental benefits such as hearing,
vision, and dental care, disease management, and well-
ness programs. Differences in plan-network structure
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benefit structures across plans. Beneficiaries focused
solely on premiums may not understand that they
could face higher cost-sharing at the point of service,
as well as greater coverage limitations, in a low-pre-
mium MA plan than one with a higher premium.
In fact, beneficiaries are increasingly at risk of
high cost-sharing when they are enrolled in some MA
plans, even though those plans are typically marketed
as offering cost savings relative to traditional Medicare
with Medigap supplementation. The authors of one
recent study estimated that annual out-of-pocket
spending for a Medicare beneficiary in poor health
(assuming use of a given set of health care services)
varied from a low of $1,359 to a high of $7,522 across
88 MA plans in 2005. In addition, beneficiaries
enrolled in almost one-fourth of the plans that the
researchers studied paid more out of pocket in man-
aged care than they would have in fee-for-service
Medicare with supplemental insurance (Medigap Plan
F).10 Another recent study confirms that on average,
MA plans provided extra benefits above what tradi-
tional Medicare covered in 2006, but that the value of
extra benefits was lower for private fee-for-service
plans than for other MA plans—meaningful differ-
ences few beneficiaries would be able to detect.11
The variation in cost-sharing structures results
from the flexibility provided to plans. There are only a
few specific constraints on plans in law or regulations:
MA plans are required to provide all of the services
covered under fee-for-service Medicare, and they may
not impose cost-sharing for flu and pneumonia vac-
cines, charge cost-sharing in excess of $50 for hospital
emergency-room services, or require a referral for a
mammography.12 However, MA plans are free to impose
beneficiary cost-sharing structures that are signifi-
cantly different from that of fee-for-service Medicare.
Options for Improving Beneficiary Choice
Even the strongest supporters of competition in
Medicare acknowledge that the choices facing benefi-
ciaries are increasingly complex and that there is great
potential for misinformation and confusion in the cur-
rent market. But there is substantial disagreement
about what, if anything, needs to be done about it. We
discuss here three policy options designed to help sim-
plify the process.
The first is for CMS to develop informational
formats that are more comparable, more meaningful to
beneficiaries, and more complete; in addition, CMS
would provide decision-making tools that help benefi-
ciaries understand which plans might best fit their
own circumstances. The second option is to require
all plans to limit enrollees’ out-of-pocket spending
liability, thereby providing them with an important
piece of information to guide plan selection and a
crucial protection against bad choices—or bad circum-
stances. Regional PPOs are required to cap beneficiary
out-of-pocket costs, and this requirement could be
extended to all MA plans. The third option is to stan-
dardize plan benefits by restricting insurers to a lim-
ited set of benefit designs, similar to the way in which
the Medigap market was standardized in 1992. With
more standardization, the number of dimensions along
which plans vary would be reduced, beneficiaries
would be better able to make more meaningful com-
parisons of the available plans, and plans would be
encouraged to compete on dimensions of service that
matter most to beneficiaries. Benefit packages could
be fully standardized—with, say, 10 cost-sharing
alternatives—or a more incremental approach could
be considered, with standardization of some but not
all MA benefits.
Each of these options, which are not mutually
exclusive, is considered in turn below.
Option 1: Provide more standardized infor-
mation and better decision-support tools.
(This option has three parts: 1a, 1b, and 1c.)
1a. Provide more standardized information.
One way to help beneficiaries make direct compar-
isons across plans is to change the way in which infor-
mation on cost-sharing is reported. For example, bene-
ficiaries now have difficulty comparing the costs that
would be incurred for a hospital stay because plans use
varying methods to assess cost-sharing—including
coinsurance, copayments per day, copayments per stay,
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and deductibles combined with daily copayments for
stays that extend beyond a certain number of days.
Further, even if all of the plans in a market area used
the same kind of cost-sharing—say, collecting a
copayment per day—the resulting liabilities would be
hard to compare unless they also changed their current
practice of varying the copayment amount and the
number of days over which it is collected.
We examined the variation in out-of-pocket
costs for hospital stays in all of the local HMO, PPO,
and POS plans listed in the Medicare Personal Plan
Finder in 2006 and calculated that costs for a three-day
hospital stay ranged from $0 to $1,500 and for a 21-
day stay the span was $0 to $4,800 (see Table 3).
Similarly, cost-sharing approaches and beneficiaries’
out-of-pocket cost risks also varied widely for stays in
a skilled nursing facility (SNF): costs for a 7-day SNF
stay ranged from $0 to $2,000, and for a 100-day stay
from $0 to $15,000 (see Table 4). These differences,
though dramatic, might not be apparent to beneficiar-
ies in the current format.
Beneficiaries could sort through such variations
more readily if plans provided comparative informa-
tion on what a beneficiary would pay in any given
plan for hospital stays of varying lengths. Cost-sharing
for hospital or SNF stays of specified lengths (for
Table 3. Out-of-Pocket Costs for Inpatient Hospital Services, by Length of Stay, All Plans, 2006
Length of Stay
3 days 7 days 14 days 21 days 90 days
Average $325.31 $556.99 $691.36 $717.42 $947.67
Minimum $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Median $300 $500 $500 $500 $500
Maximum $1,500 $2,450 $4,130 $4,800 $8,126
Mode $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
75th Percentile $525 $875 $956 $956 $1,000
Percent of Plans at the Mode 19% 19% 19% 19% 19%
Source: Authors’ estimates based on Medicare Personal Plan Finder data, downloaded March 9, 2006.
Estimates are for local HMO, PPO, and POS plans only.
Table 4. Out-of-Pocket Costs for Skilled Nursing Facility Services, by Length of Stay, All Plans, 2006
Length of Stay
7 days 14 days 21 days 60 days 100 days
Average $102 $298 $550 $2,141 $3,489
Minimum $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Median $0 $75 $210 $1,700 $2,400
Maximum $2,000 $2,520 $3,200 $9,000 $15,000
Mode $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
75th percentile $75 $400 $850 $3,750 $6,000
Percent of Plans at the Mode 67% 44% 24% 22% 22%
Source: Authors’ estimates based on Medicare Personal Plan Finder data, downloaded March 9, 2006.
Estimates are for local HMO, PPO, and POS plans only.
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example, 7-day, 21-day, and 90-day stays) could be
reported. These figures could be complemented by dis-
aggregations into the kind and level of cost-sharing
assessed, which vary across plans and are difficult for
beneficiaries to compare.
A further example addresses the overall cap on
out-of-pocket costs. In this case, there are fewer defi-
nitional issues, although plans sometimes exclude cer-
tain costs from their caps, such as cost-sharing for the
physician-administered drugs paid under Part B. But
even where an overall cap is used, this information is
hard to find using Medicare’s online tool. When a plan
has a cap, that fact is clearly stated under “Premium
and Other Important Information.” But when a plan
has no cap, Medicare Options Compare includes no
statement. Thus, unless the beneficiary is comparing a
plan with a cap to one without, he or she receives no
guidance about any caps on out-of-pocket costs.
1b. Require plans to use a standard template
when describing benefit design and cost-sharing in
their marketing materials. Beneficiary counselors
have told us that most beneficiaries make choices on
their own, without the assistance of insurance special-
ists or other independent professionals, and that they
typically rely on the brochures sent to them by private
plans. For beneficiaries to be able to use these materi-
als effectively, they need to be able to make side-by-
side comparisons of plan benefits and cost-sharing. To
facilitate that goal, CMS could require insurers to use
a standard template so that a beneficiary could readily
locate comparable information in the brochures of
competing plans.
The U.S. Government Accountability Office
(GAO) made such a recommendation when it exam-
ined the operation of the Medicare+Choice program
(the predecessor to Medicare Advantage) in the late
1990s.13 The GAO suggested that Medicare standard-
ize the presentation of plans’ marketing materials, sim-
ilar to the approach used in managing the Federal
Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP). The
Office of Personnel Management allows FEHBP plan
benefit packages to vary, but it requires that plan mate-
rials follow a standard format and terminology.
To set a similar requirement for MA plans,
CMS would not have to start from scratch. Its market-
ing guidance already specifies that plans include par-
ticular elements, use standard terminology, and submit
marketing materials to CMS regional offices for
review. In addition, standardized forms are available,
including a model Education and Outreach letter, a
model Summary of Benefits form that plans may use
to provide information about the plan to prospective
enrollees, and a model Evidence of Coverage (EOC)
document that summarizes plan benefits for those
who have enrolled.14 In fact, recognizing that these
EOCs still vary quite considerably, CMS has strength-
ened the requirements for standardized documents in
its 2009 call letter.15 However, beneficiary advocates
on our expert panel argued that information presented
in current plan marketing brochures is not sufficiently
standardized.
Therefore CMS could go further. If all plans
were required to follow a standard template for their
marketing brochures—with standard terminology,
standard elements, and standard outline (that is, pre-
sented in the same order)—beneficiaries who rely on
printed marketing materials would have an easier time
finding the information they need and making direct
plan comparisons.
1c. Develop better tools to support individual
decision-making. Beneficiaries would profit from a
tool that guided them through the options and gave
them a bottom-line assessment of their out-of-pocket
cost risk in any given plan. Ideally, such cost estimates
would be highly “individualized”—based, for exam-
ple, on information about a beneficiary’s past health
care use.
Medicare has provided an out-of-pocket cost
calculator in the past, though none was available in
2006. The Medicare Options Compare online tool for
2007 and 2008 includes annual out-of-pocket cost esti-
mates, for beneficiaries in 30 age and health status cat-
egories, specific to the plans available in particular
market areas.
But because the cost calculator reports averages
across beneficiary groups, it is necessarily an imprecise
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guide for individuals, whose utilization and costs vary
widely. For example, a cancer patient in the same age
and health status category as a cardiac patient may
have substantially different out-of-pocket costs because
of differences in prescription drugs or in the relative
use of physician versus inpatient hospital services.
Although the 2008 version of Medicare Options
Compare also includes some information on typical
costs for beneficiaries with certain health conditions,
that information is still far more general than the situa-
tion faced by any individual beneficiary.
Other weaknesses of the cost calculator are that
it does not allow a beneficiary to see how the compo-
nents of out-of-pocket spending vary across specific
plans and it doesn’t include estimated costs for the full
range of services that some patients might use. A more
sophisticated tool might calculate costs of services
under various scenarios or project an individual’s past
experience into future spending.16
Discussion. It is hard to argue with the asser-
tion that Medicare beneficiaries should receive better
information—accurate, meaningful, and presented in
standard formats—to help them evaluate their health
plan choices. Similarly, proposals to give beneficiaries
better tools for processing the information are unlikely
to encounter much resistance.
But these steps alone are unlikely to solve the
choice problem for most beneficiaries. Advanced deci-
sion aids, such as those that factor in past health care
use, may be useful for sophisticated consumers of
health insurance coverage but perhaps not for the major-
ity of Medicare beneficiaries, who are not prepared to
undertake the effort this approach would require.
In order to be effective, requirements for more
standardized information and better decision-support
tools would also require a substantial increase in the
use of one-on-one beneficiary counseling. Medicare
provides funds to the states so that they can offer
counseling through State Health Insurance Assistance
Programs, or SHIPs, but there is widespread agree-
ment that SHIPs are “tremendously under-resourced.”17
In fact, in its 2008 report to Congress, MedPAC rec-
ommends that the SHIPs receive more funding.
Option 2: Require all MA plans to limit
beneficiaries’ out-of-pocket spending.
This proposal addresses one dimension of beneficiar-
ies’ information gap by requiring all plans to specify
an out-of-pocket spending cap and to adopt a standard
method for determining when that cap has been
reached. Today, all regional PPOs must have a cap on
out-of-pocket spending for in-network services (and a
separate cap for services received out of network), but
there is no such requirement for local MA plans. As a
result, most of them—65 percent of local HMO, POS,
and PPO plans in 2006—did not have a cap. Further,
as noted earlier, the absence of a limit on out-of-
pocket spending is not clearly shown on Medicare
Options Compare.
Requiring plans to adopt such a cap is a rela-
tively straightforward option that might mitigate
some of the financial risk that beneficiaries enrolled
in some MA plans now face. Moreover, this upper
bound could provide an important piece of information
to beneficiaries about differences in cost-sharing
across plans.
Discussion. Like the proposal to enhance the
accuracy, completeness, and comparability of the
information provided to beneficiaries, there may not
be much political resistance to a proposal for an out-
of-pocket cost cap. In fact, Congress has already indi-
cated its willingness to move in this direction, as evi-
denced by its requirements on regional PPOs. In addi-
tion, CMS has begun recommending that plans limit
cost-sharing liability for Medicare Part A and Part B
services. In its letter inviting bids for 2007, CMS sug-
gested that plans limit annual out-of-pocket spending
for Medicare-covered services, excluding the basic
monthly premium, at $3,100 for the 2007 contract year
(increased to $3,350 for 2009). Plans that did so were
granted “latitude” in establishing cost-sharing amounts
for individual services. Plans with out-of-pocket caps
in excess of $3,100 were granted “less latitude.”18
Among local Medicare Advantage plans with an out-
of-pocket cost cap in 2006, the upper bounds ranged
from $200 to $10,000; roughly three-quarters of these
plans had a cost cap between $1,500 and $3,500.19
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If plans were obliged solely to have a cost cap
for services received, it is likely that there would be
significant variability, as happens today, in how plans
define and implement this limit. To make it helpful to
beneficiaries, CMS should standardize both the services
included under the cap and the method by which spend-
ing toward the cap would be counted. The standard
approach would also have to include a determination
of whether a separate limit on out-of-network services
would be allowed or whether and how those costs
would be applied to the overall limit.
Option 3: Standardize benefits and
cost-sharing.
A third option for improving beneficiary choice is to
adopt a number of standardized benefit packages and
cost-sharing regimes. Rather than allowing the current
degree of flexibility—along with its variation and
complexity—policymakers could restrict insurers to a
set of standard features, much the way the market for
Medigap (supplemental insurance) policies was stan-
dardized in 1992, as required by the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990. The Medigap market had
been relatively unstructured until then, with no
national rules, but the reforms created 10 standardized
benefit packages (labeled A through J) that insurance
companies could offer. All insurers seeking to sell
Medigap in a state were required to offer Plan A; they
could offer any or all of the other nine benefit pack-
ages as well, but they were not required to do so.20
The goal of the Medigap standardization was to
improve beneficiaries’ ability to make price comparisons
across equivalent products, thereby encouraging more
price competition among plans, and it is widely agreed
that the reforms accomplished that goal. The standard-
ization improved beneficiaries’ understanding of their
options, and it dramatically reduced consumer com-
plaints about deceptive sales practices.21 Beneficiaries
could easily compare the benefits in the 10 standard
insurance policies and choose a package of benefits
best suited to their needs at a premium they could
afford. In addition, because the benefits do not vary
from year to year, consumers have not been faced with
new policies (offering marginally different benefits)
each year and the consequent need to keep reevaluat-
ing their coverage.22
Many of the problems that burdened the
Medigap market before it was standardized are charac-
teristic of Medicare Advantage today. Thus some
experts—in a recent report, for example, by authors
from two beneficiary counseling organizations—have
called for a similar approach to standardizing
Medicare Advantage.23
MA cost-sharing could be standardized in a few
different ways. The Medigap market offers two vari-
ants: a fully standardized model, such as the A–J set
of standard plans implemented in 1992; and a core-
plus-rider approach, which is used in three states that
standardized their Medigap market before 1992.
Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Wisconsin received
waivers from the federal law that allowed them to pre-
serve their own approaches to standardization. The
fully standardized option would necessarily produce
fewer cost-sharing regimes. In a core-plus-rider
approach, the array of benefit packages would poten-
tially be much larger; even with relatively few core
benefit packages and riders, beneficiaries have the
flexibility to combine them in unique ways.
A number of the experts in the panels we con-
vened thought that a core-plus-rider approach would
make the most sense for the MA program. However,
they each had different ideas about how many riders
were necessary or desirable. Some panelists envisioned
relatively few supplemental riders, all of which would
expand on the core benefit package—as described in
a research report prepared in 2003 for CMS.24 Based
on an analysis of plan offerings in 2001, this report
described three core plans and eight supplemental
riders (low- and high-option plans for each of four
supplemental benefits—prescription drugs, dental
services, vision services, and hearing services). The
three core benefit packages included the basic Medicare
A and B services, as well as a set of enhanced services
that plans typically offered in 2001 (for example,
worldwide emergency and urgent care, additional
physical exams, and routine chiropractic care).
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One of the panelists suggested that there ought
to be a far greater number of riders (perhaps as many
as 20), which could adjust the core benefit package
in various ways. Some riders would add coverage,
expanding on the core benefits, while other riders
might reduce the core coverage by increasing benefici-
ary cost-sharing for a specific service. The beneficiary
could select from among these many riders and gener-
ate an individualized insurance plan.
While some experts on the panel clearly wished
to preserve as much flexibility in cost-sharing and ben-
efit design as possible, others favored standardized
packages. They are easy to understand, beneficiaries
face distinct and meaningful alternatives, and the bur-
den of choice is reduced.
Table 5 illustrates how a fully standardized
approach might work, using four standardized plans.
The approach, as presented here, is highly simplified,
but it illustrates how the plans relate to one another in
ways that can be explained to beneficiaries, with Plan
1 providing the lowest cost-sharing across all covered
services and each subsequent plan offering equal or
progressively higher cost-sharing.
Plan 1 adopts the most common cost-sharing
for each MA benefit in 2006: $10 for a primary care
office visit, $20 for a specialist visit, $0 for a mam-
mography or for outpatient hospital services, $50 for
emergency department services, and so on. Plan 2 and
Plan 3 offer modest but somewhat higher cost-sharing
and have higher out-of-pocket caps. Plan 4 assesses 20
percent coinsurance for most Part B services (the same
as traditional Medicare), imposes higher cost-sharing
for inpatient hospital services, and has the highest cap
on out-of-pocket costs. (More detailed data on MA
cost-sharing in 2006 are provided in Appendix A.)
These plans should be considered a starting
point for discussion. Getting to a set of choices that
is meaningful to beneficiaries and feasible for the
Table 5. An Option for Standardized Core Benefit Packages
Plan 1 Plan 2 Plan 3 Plan 4
Plan OOP Max $1,000 $2,000 $3,000 $4,500
Primary Care Office Visit $10 $10 $15 $15
Specialist Office Visit $20 $20 $30 $30
Mammography Services $0 $0 $0 $0
X-ray Services $0 $0 $15 20%
Clinical Lab Services $0 $0 $15 20%
Radiation Therapy $0 $0 $15 20%
Outpatient Hospital Services $0 $50 $100 20%
Ambulatory Surgical Center Services $0 $50 $100 20%
Home Health Services $0 $0 $0 $0
Emergency Department Services $50 $50 $50 20%
(up to $50)
Inpatient Hospital OOP Max — — — $1,500
Inpatient Hospital Copay per Stay $0 $250 $750 —
Inpatient Hospital Daily Copays — — — $300
Skilled Nursing Facility Services OOP Max $0 — — —
SNF Copay per Stay — — — —
SNF Daily Copays — $50/day, $75/day, $100/day,
— days 21–100 days 21–100 days 21–100
Notes: OOP = out of pocket; “—” means the plan has no parameter in that category.
Source: Authors’ examples based loosely on 2006 MA plan offerings.
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industry would require a more detailed analysis of
variation in benefit designs and cost-sharing within
and across markets, an actuarial analysis of premiums,
and a better understanding of the alternatives that ben-
eficiaries want. In addition, a concrete proposal for a
fully standardized model would need to consider how
to handle prescription drugs and supplemental benefits
(for example, vision, dental, hearing).25
Discussion. A strong case can be made that
doing something to limit variation and complexity in
private plan offerings would help beneficiaries make
more meaningful price comparisons of competing
plans. Plans will continue to vary across other dimen-
sions that matter to beneficiaries, including whether
they will be able to maintain relationships with current
providers, and the number, quality, mix, and conven-
ience of providers in a plan’s network. But standard-
ized cost-sharing will greatly simplify the task of eval-
uating the competing plans and could be supplemented
with better measures of plan networks and the quality
of participating providers—or at least better ways to
present these dimensions to beneficiaries.
But proposals to limit plans’ flexibility in
designing their benefit packages would be opposed by
arguments that standardization stifles innovation—that
it would prevent plans from adopting new cost-sharing
approaches designed to steer beneficiaries toward
more cost-effective providers, for example. A second
criticism is that standardization might raise costs and
thus have the effect of eroding access to private plans
for Medicare beneficiaries with modest incomes. Some
argue as well that standardization would exacerbate
geographic inequities in MA offerings nationwide. The
benefit of clearer and better-defined choices, however,
would be that competition could be focused on dimen-
sions that matter most to beneficiaries.
One challenge is that the standardized scheme
would need to be updated over time. Thus any pro-
posal for standardizing benefits would need to include
a mechanism for ensuring that the available benefit
packages respond to the needs of current and future
enrollees. A proposal would need to specify, for exam-
ple, how often or under what circumstances the system
should be updated and what entity would be responsi-
ble for doing that. It may even make sense to avoid
locking specific cost-sharing parameters into law or
CMS regulations; that way, they could be more easily
updated from year to year.
Some members of our panel expressed concern
that the biggest problems faced by enrollees stem not
from relatively small variations in cost-sharing but
rather from the practices that plans adopt to manage
service use. Beneficiaries choosing a standardized
benefit package may still experience variations in cost
and access from other aspects of plan operation—
especially plans’ approaches to utilization manage-
ment, prior authorization rules, and other review
requirements that must be met before paying for ser-
vices. What is needed, these experts argued, is not
standardized cost-sharing but the increased federal
oversight and enforcement of rules that govern plans’
day-to-day practices.
Conclusion
The complexity and variability of the benefits offered
by Medicare Advantage plans give beneficiaries
many options to find plans that best suit their needs,
but also create a significant problem. The array of
options is bewildering, with a multiplicity of benefit
packages and a large number of competing plans.
Making a choice may more closely resemble a “roll
of the dice” than an informed choice among compet-
ing alternatives.26
Rather than leaving beneficiaries to grapple
with dozens of Medicare Advantage plans that vary
widely, the number of cost-sharing regimes could be
restricted, thereby providing limited and more mean-
ingful variation that consumers nationwide could more
readily understand. By constraining variation in cost-
sharing and benefit design, standardization would
make it easier for beneficiaries to focus on other
important aspects of plans, such as measures of quality
of care, differences in plan networks, and customer
service. Moreover, better-informed beneficiaries could
improve operation of the market principles that are
fundamental to the Medicare Advantage vision.
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Nevertheless, because there are legitimate con-
cerns about comprehensive regulatory constraints on
private plans, a more realistic path might be to pursue
incremental improvements—to standardize cost-sharing
only for certain benefits that have been problematic.
This more modest approach has been suggested before.
The authors of a 1999 paper on Medicare standardiza-
tion argued in favor of it, suggesting that the process
might start with the method used by HMOs to calculate
when a benefit limit has been reached.27
Today, CMS has considerable regulatory
authority to push plans toward increased standardiza-
tion, should it choose to do so. For example, because
the agency is empowered to negotiate with plans
during the bidding process, many observers have
suggested that it impose stricter limits with regard to
cost-sharing and benefit design. But although CMS
has made insurers aware in recent years of its concerns
that some plans have inappropriately imposed high cost-
sharing on nondiscretionary services—such as radia-
tion, chemotherapy, and Part B drugs—the agency has
so far imposed few specific requirements.
Whether reforms are pursued by CMS’s exer-
cising of its regulatory authority or in the legislative
arena by Congress, greater standardization of MA plans
would help assure that consumers know what they are
buying when they enroll. It would allow them to make
more meaningful price comparisons across competing
insurers—something that is virtually impossible in
today’s Medicare Advantage marketplace.
To help assess the feasibility of standardizing
Medicare Advantage benefit designs, we analyzed data
on how MA plans currently structure cost-sharing for
selected Medicare-covered services. Specifically, we
obtained data from the Medicare Personal Plan Finder
for a subset of core Medicare-covered services, and
for most MA plans, in 2006. We examined cost-shar-
ing structures (e.g., copayments, coinsurance) used
by plans and the levels of cost-sharing assessed to
get a sense of whether plans are standardized across
the nation and within selected markets.28
We analyzed in-network cost-sharing for all of
the local HMOs, PPOs, and HMO plans with point-of-
service options, as listed in the Plan Finder on March
9, 2006. These included 1,122 local HMOs, 93 local
HMO point-of-service plans, and 337 local PPOs,
together representing 82 percent of MA offerings.29
SNPs were excluded from the analysis, as were PFFS
plans, regional PPOs, cost plans, provider-sponsored
organizations, and a few other plan types.
Table A-1 shows that plans largely used copay-
ments for most services, though coinsurance was not
uncommon for some services. Plans usually charged a
fixed amount for all services within a benefit category,
but some plans charged differential amounts (a range
of copayment or coinsurance amounts, e.g., a copay-
ment for outpatient hospital services of “$0 to $125” or
“$25 to $75” or coinsurance of “0% to 20%” or “10%
to 20%”). These ranges were based on the specific
service received—a lower amount for a standard X-ray,
for example, and a higher amount for an MRI—or
sometimes the amounts differed as a function of where
the beneficiary received the service. That is, some
plans used tiered networks, collecting different cost-
sharing amounts for different in-network providers.
Table A-2 shows how plans structured cost-
sharing for hospital and skilled nursing facility ser-
vices in 2006. For inpatient hospital services, roughly
half of the plans used daily copayments and half used
a flat copayment per stay. For SNF services, roughly
three-quarters used daily copayments and about a
quarter used a flat copayment for a stay of between
1 and 100 days.
Table A-3 consolidates the information and
identifies the most common cost-sharing arrangements
in Medicare Advantage plans for various one-time
services, such as doctor’s office visits and mammogra-
phy services.
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Table A-1. Structure of Cost-Sharing, Selected Services, 2006
How Plans Structure Cost-Sharing
Range of Range of
Benefit Copayment Coinsurance Copayments Coinsurance
Primary Care Office Visit 90% 2% 7% 0%
Specialist Office Visit 96% 3% 1% 0%
Mammography Services 93% 2% 5% 0%
X-ray Services 44% 7% 38% 11%
Clinical Lab Services 66% 5% 24% 5%
Radiation Therapy 65% 22% 12% 1%
Outpatient Hospital Services 60% 17% 22% 1%
Ambulatory Surgical Center Services 78% 16% 6% 1%
Home Health Services 91% 2% 7% 0%
Emergency Department Services 92% 4% 3% 0%
Note: Data are for 1,552 local HMO, POS, and PPO plans.
Source: Authors’ estimates based on 2006 Medicare Personal Plan Finder data, downloaded March 9, 2006.
Table A-2. Cost-Sharing, Inpatient Hospital and Skilled Nursing Facility Services, 2006
How Plans Structure Cost-Sharing
Copayment Copayment per
Benefit per Stay Day of Care Coinsurance Deductible*
Inpatient Hospital Services 41% 53% 3% 3%
Skilled Nursing Facility Services 23% 74%** 4%*** 0%****
* A deductible of $912 or $956 was assessed, and these plans also collected daily copayments ($228 or $239) for days 61 to 90.
Many of these plans covered an unlimited number of days, others used the standard 90-day max, and some covered 150 days.
** Includes seven plans that had upfront copays for the stay plus additional daily copays for later days (e.g., $50 + $50 for days 35 to 100).
*** Includes 49 plans, 42 with fixed coinsurance and 7 that used tiered coinsurance (e.g., 10% coinsurance for days 1 to 10 and
40% coinsurance for days 21 to 100, or 0% for days 1 to 10 and 25% for days 11 to 100).
**** Five plans had a deductible for SNF services.
Source: Authors’ estimates based on Medicare Personal Plan Finder data, downloaded March 9, 2006.
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